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Vredenburg v. Sedgwick CMS and Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, 124 Nev. Adv.
Op. No. 53 (July 24, 2008) 1
INSURANCE LAW - WORKER’S COMPENSATION
Summary
Vredenburg appeals a district court order denying her petition for judicial review of her
workman’s compensation matter.
Disposition/Outcome
The district court’s dismissal of Vredenburg’s petition for judicial review is reversed and
remanded with instructions. The court concludes the workers’ compensation willful self-injury
exclusion does not preclude a surviving family member from recovering workers’ compensation
and death benefits where the deceased’s suicide is sufficiently causally linked to his industrial
industry. Sufficient causation is established if the claimant shows (1) the deceased suffered an
industrial injury, (2) the industrial injury caused a psychological condition severe enough to
overcome the deceased’s rational judgment, and (3) the psychological condition caused the
deceased to commit suicide. The appeals officer in this case misapplied the test and her factbased conclusions were unsupported by substantial evidence.
Factual and Procedural History
Danny Vredenburg injured his back when he slipped on a flight of stairs while working
as a bartender for Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin. Danny experienced constant pain from this injury.
He underwent fusion surgery, but it failed to relieve his pain. He also underwent extensive pain
management therapy, which also failed to correct his condition. Danny was eventually
diagnosed with “failed back syndrome” and prescribed strong pain medication, antidepressants,
muscle relaxants, epidural injections, and, eventually, a surgically implanted morphine infusion
pump in his spine. Nothing helped. Dr. Kim, one of Danny’s pain management physicians,
stated that Danny’s chronic pain caused him to become “psychologically de-stabilized.” Danny
eventually committed suicide. Dr. Anderson opined that Danny committed suicide because of
his unrelenting intractable pain.
Based on Dr. Anderson’s opinion, Sharon Vredenburg, Danny’s surviving spouse, filed a
workers’ compensation claim for death benefits because Danny took his life because of the
constant pain from his industrial injury. The Flamingo’s insurance administrator denied the
claim. The hearing officer affirmed the denial and Vredenburg appealed to an appeals officer.
Although no test had been established to address this issue at the time of the appeal, Vredenburg
argued that her claim was compensable under the chain-of-causation test followed by the
Arizona Supreme Court. 2 The appeals officer disagreed and affirmed the claim denial because
(1) the chain-of-causation test was not binding in Nevada; (2) even if it was, Graver Tank was
distinguishable because Danny’s suicide was deliberate and not the product of insanity; and (3)
Vredenburg did not conclusively establish that Danny was devoid of rationality and dominated
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Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 399 P.2d 664, 668 (Ariz. 1965).

by insanity directly caused by his industrial injury. Vredenburg’s petition for judicial review in
the district court was denied and this appeal followed.
Discussion
The appeals officer’s factual and legal conclusions are reviewed for clear error or an
abuse of discretion. 3 Pure questions of law, like the question addressed in this case, are reviewed
de novo. 4
N.R.S. 616C.230(1) states that an employee’s death is not compensable under worker’s
compensation if it results from a “willful intention” to inflict self-injury. The court has never
addressed under what circumstances suicides can be considered non-willful under N.R.S.
616C.230(1). The issue is whether the court should adopt the more restrictive minority approach
for causation (voluntary willful choice test) or the majority test (chain-of-causation test).
The voluntary willful choice test compensates for suicide only if it (1) was caused by an
uncontrollable impulse or delirium of frenzy, and (2) occurred when the employee was irrational
and unaware of the physical consequences of his actions. 5 The court declines to adopt this
approach because the first prong is underinclusive in that it only compensates suicides that are
dramatic and occur within a short time after the injury and the second prong contained an overly
restrictive criminal standard of insanity. Moreover, this test has only been adopted by a minority
of states, many of which have modified it or abandoned it completely.
Under the chain-of-causation test, the claimant must show a clear chain of causation
between the industrial injury and the employee’s suicide. 6 Specifically, the claimant must prove
(1) the employee suffered an industrial injury, (2) the industrial injury caused a psychological
condition severe enough to overcome the employee’s rational judgment, and (3) the
psychological condition caused the employee to commit suicide. 7 The court adopts this
approach because it largely eliminates the volition and knowledge problems under the voluntary
willful choice test, it is more closely aligned with the remedial purpose of the Nevada workers’
compensation statutes, 8 and it aligns with Nevada’s doctrine of compensable consequences. 9
The appeals officer’s decision in this case is factually and legally erroneous. First, the
officer applied the minority willful choice test by concluding that an adequate causal connection
was not established because Danny deliberately decided to commit suicide. Whether an
employee acts deliberately is irrelevant under the chain-of-causation test. Second, the officer
3
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required Vredenburg to produce conclusive evidence that Danny’s industrial injury caused him
to become irrational and commit suicide. However, a claimant must only establish the causal
nexus by a preponderance of the evidence. 10 Last, the officer’s finding that Danny’s suicide
resulted from something other than his injury is against the weight of the evidence.
Conclusion
If the cause of an employee’s suicide is causally linked to an industrial injury, it may be a
non-willful death under Nevada’s worker’s compensation scheme. The court adopts the chainof-causation test to determine whether a sufficient causal nexus has been established. The
appeals officer’s decision in this case was clearly erroneous because the officer misapplied the
chain-of-causation test and her factual findings are unsupported by the record. Thus, the district
court’s order denying Vredenburg’s petition for judicial review is reversed and remanded with
instructions to the district court to remand the matter to the appeals officer for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
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See McClanahan v. Raley’s, Inc., 117 Nev. 921, 925-26, 34 P.3d 573, 576 (2001) (“‘[P]reponderance of the
evidence’ merely refers to ‘[t]he greater weight of the evidence.’” (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1201 (7th ed.
1999)). Furthermore, to the extent the appeals officer’s decision suggests that Graver Tank requires expert medical
testimony to succeed under the chain-of-causation test, we disagree. As one recent Arizona appellate court noted
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